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This paper brings together ﬁrm-level research on business models and industry-level research on value migration to examine patterns of
business model innovation. We draw on qualitative data from 14 cases and 68 interviews in the computer and telecommunications
industries to demonstrate how business model innovation is sensitive to industry-wide forces of value migration. Based on our analysis
we conclude that when value is rapidly migrating across industries and between ﬁrms, proactively substituting key elements of the
primary business model provides a better ﬁt with the new value landscape than launching secondary business models in parallel. We
suggest four underlying mechanisms that link business model innovation, value migration and subsequent outcomes. Unpacking business
model innovation allows us to discuss contingencies for the main business model strategies, speciﬁcally in terms of limitations todand
opportunities ofdchanging the primary business model and the practice of parallel business models.
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
Only months after the ‘dotcom’ bubble burst in 2001 when countless young, promising and innovative technology ven-
tures went bankrupt and the euphoria of the ‘new’ economy disappeared, the computer and telecommunications industries
appeared to be getting back to normal again. But were they? In an article published by the Business Week in 2001, Mr. Jorma
Ollila, CEO of Nokia, the world's largest cellphone manufacturer at that time, stressed the need for the emerging “mobile
Internet” to remain “under the control of the mobile industry, and not the computer makers” (Baker, 2001). Less than ten years
later, his successor Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo found his ﬁrm in a peculiar situation. While still the market leader in cell phones,
Nokia's previous largest competitors had all been replaced by new players. These new competitors were a different breed.
What used to be Motorola, Ericsson, and Siemens were suddenly Samsung, LG, and RIM (Gartner, 2000, 2010) without any
particular track record in the mobile industry. More worrying still, revenue streams started to divert away from Nokia's core
business. To sustain their mobile handset business, Nokia was forced to partner with software giant Microsoft and appointed
Microsoft executive Stephen Elop as their new CEO. Ultimately, the joint venture between the two ﬁrms was dismantled, and
the business was completely taken over byMicrosoft in 2013, before being written off in 2015 (Forbes, 2015). In only six years,
Nokia went from being the market leader in mobile handsets to crashing out of business.
What could have caused such a dramatic result? A critical explanation is that value in the mobile industry started to
migrate (Jacobides and MacDufﬁe, 2013; Slywotzky, 1996), amongst others, to a fast mover from Northern California that had
only recently entered the industry with their iPhone product. Apple entered the mobile industry as a complete outsider and* Corresponding author.
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technology towards software and content. Whereas the old business model was about selling devices, voice minutes and text
messages, value started to migrate to an ecosystem of applications and mobile services. The time was ripe for a new business
model that could create and capture value.
We analyze these dramatic shifts in the computer and telecommunications industries from a business model perspective
(Baden-Fuller and Haeﬂiger, 2013; Bj€orkdahl, 2009; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Demil and Lecocq, 2010; Zott and
Amit, 2007, 2008, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). There is a growing consensus that ﬁrms need to change, adapt and innovate
their business models in order to appropriate value from technological innovation (Baden-Fuller and Haeﬂiger, 2013;
Bj€orkdahl, 2009; Hienerth et al., 2011) and to sustain success over time (Chesbrough, 2010; Massa and Tucci, 2013; Teece,
2010). However, scholars are still debating the merits of different business model innovation strategies. One powerful
stream of business model research advocates the operation of multiple, parallel, and partly even conﬂicting business models
as a mechanism for hedging risks and opportunities (Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012; Markides and Charitou, 2004;
Markides, 2013). An alternative view suggests changing the primary business model to alignwith shifting demands (Bock and
George, 2014; Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Johnson et al., 2008; McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010).
To shed new light on these opposing business model innovation strategies, we marry the ﬁrm-level research on business
models with industry-level research on value migration. Value migration is here deﬁned as the shift in value-creating forces
that makes value move between ﬁrms and their business models (Slywotzky, 1996). Often this happens as value moves from
old business models to new business models that better meet customers’ concerns and desires. Speciﬁcally, we ask: how can
ﬁrms pursue business model innovation when value is migrating across industries and between ﬁrms? More broadly, answering
this question allows us to start exploring the largely neglected relationship between industry dynamics and business model
innovation (see e.g. Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994a; Dosi, 1984; Carlsson, 1997 for in-depth discussions on
industry forces that enable and constrain ﬁrm-level innovation).
We investigate this question through a multiple case study of 14 large and prominent ﬁrms in the converging computer
and telecommunications industries. We demonstrate that when the industry is characterized by rapid value migration, ﬁrms
are most successful when they take a proactive stance by substituting key elements of their primary business model in
tandem with the external business environmentda practice known as ‘pivoting’ (e.g., Blank, 2013). Our results are incor-
porated into a wider contingency framework that allows us to contribute to the debate on the advantages and disadvantages
of changing the primary business model or launching secondary business models that run in parallel (e.g., Markides, 2013).
This article is organized as follows. Section Literature review: value migration and business model innovation reviews
the literature and sets the theoretical foundation for our study. Section Research design presents the research design and
introduces our empirical setting. Section Findings: patterns of business model innovation presents our ﬁndings and
provides a ﬁrst categorization of the patterns observed. Section Discussion: explaining business model innovation in
dynamic environments discusses explanations for our observations and theorizes on a set of underlying mechanisms.
Section Contributions to theory and practice concludes the paper by summarizing our contributions to theory and
practice.
Literature review: value migration and business model innovation
In the ﬁeld of strategy, it is well established that ﬁrm-level decision making is inﬂuenced by meso- and macro-level
phenomena (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; also see the industry lifecycle literature, e.g., Abernathy and Utterback, 1978).
Indeed, it has been acknowledged that industry-level factors such as technological developments impact business models
(e.g., Afuah and Tucci, 2001). Yet, business model research is relatively silent with regard to how the relationship between
industry dynamics and business models can be characterized, and how the resulting strategic choices available to ﬁrms
unfold. In order to develop a perspective of business model innovation that is sensitive to industry-wide phenomena, we
draw on the concept of value migration (Jacobides andMacDufﬁe, 2013; Slywotzky, 1996). If we consider, for example, the list
of Fortune 500 ﬁrms, it is easily observable that many ﬁrms that were top performers 10, 20, or 50 years ago have been
replaced by new ﬁrms from either the same or new industries. Value has clearly migrated between ﬁrms as well as industries.
Value migration can be understood as the shifting of value-creating forces that over time determine the proﬁt level of ﬁrms
(Jacobides and MacDufﬁe, 2013; Slywotzky, 1996). Value can migrate between industries and often ﬂows between ﬁrms
within the same industry (especially in industries characterized by intense competition and innovation) but can also ﬂow
between different business units or products within a ﬁrm (Slywotzky, 1996). Value can migrate from outdated business
models to new ones that have a better product-market ﬁt in relation to customers’ most important priorities (Slywotzky,
1996). While some ﬁrms may achieve value inﬂow (ﬁrms absorb value from other ﬁrms) due to changes in their business
models, others will experience value outﬂow (ﬁrms lose value to other ﬁrms) because of business models that have become
less competitive, or even outdated.
The business model literature has successfully developed frameworks and practices to capture the intricate interre-
lationship between the creation and appropriation of value (Bj€orkdahl, 2007, 2009, 2011; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom,
2002; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Teece, 2010; Zott et al., 2011; Massa et al., 2017). Most work in the realm of
business models has focused on coherence and assumed a static relationship between business model elements (see e.g.,
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perspective that addresses innovation in the business model itself e in other words, business model innovation (e.g.,
Bj€orkdahl and Holmen, 2013; Chesbrough, 2010; Sanchez and Ricart, 2010; Zott et al., 2011; Massa et al., 2017). Any
fundamental change in the relationship between business model elements can be understood as business model inno-
vation (Bj€orkdahl, 2009). We deﬁne the business model as the logic and the activities that create and appropriate eco-
nomic value as well as the link between value creation and value capture. Value migration only underscores that ﬁrms
must pursue business model innovation to remain competitive. However, ambiguities still exist regarding under what
conditions business model innovation takes place and how it plays out.
From the perspective of established ﬁrms, changing an existing business model represents a problem of focus. An
inﬂuential stream of business model research advocates running multiple, parallel, and partly even conﬂicting business
models as a mechanism for hedging risk when pursuing new opportunities. Drawing on ambidexterity literature, Markides
(2013) elaborates on the creation of such separate business models. A historic example of a company that kept two business
models physically separated is IBM that entered the personal computer market through a separated and dedicated business
model and organizational unit. Utterback (1994b) argued that the task of creating the competencies needed to successfully
enter the market hinged on creating an organizationwith clear mandates and independence from the staff and committees of
their parent company. Similarly, Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan (2012) argue that ﬁrms may need to use distinct business
models if they want to outperform competitors, forestall potential disruptors, enter new markets, make more efﬁcient use of
resources, or develop new income streams. They argue that running separate business models in tandem is a way to diversify
revenues and proﬁtsdthereby reducing risk. However, some scholars have pointed to critical challenges. For example, by
running parallel business models in separate organizations, the ﬁrm may fail to exploit synergies between them (e.g., Day
et al., 2001; Markides and Oyon, 2010; Markides, 2013). Running parallel business models is difﬁcult and is often the lead-
ing cause for strategic failure (Porter, 1980; Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012). A reason for this is that business models
cannot be anticipated in advance and must go through learning and experimentation (McGrath, 2010). As a result, running
parallel business models can be dangerous when they are planned in advance rather than learned over time. The practice of
running a parallel secondary business model leaves all the elements of the primary business model unchanged. The sec-
ondary business model is fundamentally distinct from the primary business model along one or several business model
elements, e.g., by providing a completely different customer value proposition through targeting previously untapped
customer segments via a new distribution channel. The practice allows for low degrees of integration and “Chinese walls”
provide protection against ‘contamination’ between the primary and secondary business models even though they might
share some resources.
An alternative approach is to change the primary business model to be at par with shifting demands (Bock and
George, 2014; Johnson et al., 2008; McGrath, 2010; Sosna et al., 2010; Berends et al., 2016). Instead of complementing
the primary business model with additional business models kept in parallel and separate ‘quarantines,’ the ﬁrm can
transform the elements of the primary business model in tandem with the external business environment. The argument
is that business models need to change over time if ﬁrms want to sustain their value creation and value capture
(Achtenhagen et al., 2013). Doz and Kosonen (2010) emphasize that successful ﬁrms run the risk of failure if they stay
with what used to be right, without changing their business models in line with the changing business environment.
Instead, ﬁrms need to shape, adapt, and renew their underlying business model on a continuous basis (Achtenhagen
et al., 2013). This is usually conducted by a process involving a shift from cognitive search to experiential search con-
sisting of a lengthy trial and error process in the established business model (Berends et al., 2016). Borrowing from the
language of sport, the practice of changing the primary business model is sometimes labeled pivoting. Like a basketball
player pivots by keeping one leg stationary and moving the other leg around to search for a desirable position, ﬁrms pivot
to experiment and search for an improved primary business model (for a discussion on pivoting, see e.g., Blank, 2013, p.
65). In other words, ﬁrms experiment and “tweak” elements of their existing primary business model in a path-
dependent way where pivoting (oftentimes several pivots are required to ﬁnd a desirable position) results in a new
direction and a new primary business model. These changes in a ﬁrm's primary business model are corroborated by the
dynamic capability perspective which aims to explain the success of a ﬁrm over time through its ability to change and
adapt to the environment (Teece et al., 1997; Achtenhagen et al., 2013). The dynamic capability perspective suggests that,
in order to stay competitive, ﬁrms need to adapt and renew their business models by sensing, seizing and transforming
(Teece, 2007). Such dynamic capabilities appear to be especially important in volatile environments (Teece et al., 1997;
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
Conceptually, business model innovation dovetails value migration: changes in business models might be needed when
there are structural changes in industries andwhen new ecosystems emerge (Johnson and Suskewicz, 2009)dand ﬁrms need
to reinvent where and how they create and capture value. The remainder of this paper explores how different business model
innovation strategies play out in dynamic environments, in particular, when there are strong industry-wide forces of value
migration.
Research design
The purpose of this paper is to analyze patterns of valuemigration and business model innovation.We opted for amultiple
case study design that allows us to analyze a variety of events and outcomes, examine patterns on a larger scale, and eliminate
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in parallel during the course of the research project.Research setting: ﬁrms exposed to value migration
We selected the computer and telecommunications industries as our empirical setting. These industries have been
signiﬁcantly exposed to value migration, due to massive forces of industry convergence. Industry convergence alters the
basis of competition by blurring the boundaries between previously separate industries (Lee et al., 2010; Greenstein and
Khanna, 1997). As an implication, value is migrating across industry boundaries, which creates fundamental shifts in
how value is being distributed, created, and captured (Lee, 2007). Oftentimes, this results in competition between ﬁrms
which did not compete with one another initially (Prescott et al., 2014). Well-known examples include e.g., Apple that
successfully brought together computing and mobile technologies as well as struggling Nokia, who was exposed to value
migrating rapidly away from their business (Alcacer et al., 2011a; Vuori and Huy, 2015). Speciﬁcally, the context of our ﬁrms
included in the sample is given by the value chain of the converging computer and telecommunications industries (see e.g.,
Cisco, 2016). We describe the context as ﬁve generic stages of the value chain, depicted in Fig. 1. Typically, the outputs of one
value-adding stage are the inputs of the next one, which means that value accumulates at each stage to make up the total
value stream and each of these stages moves progressively closer to the end user (Davies, 2004). The stages are as follows:
Component manufacturers, Infrastructure manufacturers, Device manufacturers, Network carriers, and Value-added service
providers (see Fig. 1).
The ﬁrms in these ﬁve stages face different business model challenges, due to changes in the industry structure driven by
value migration (Hacklin et al., 2013). The degree of value migration between ﬁrms in the computer and telecom industries
was generally lower before the industries began to converge (we label this period Era 1). The period after industry
convergence had set off (we label this period Era 2) was instead characterized by increased dynamics in the industry and
the migration of value between ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, for the ﬁrms in our sample, Era 1 represents the period of a largely
unchanged business model. Era 2 begins as value starts to migrate due to industry convergence, and the focal ﬁrm displayed
change in its business model. At the same time, the degree of value migration can vary across different stages of the value
chain (see Fig. 1).Sampling and data collection
Our sampling ensured that each stage of the value chain would correspond to at least two ﬁrms. Additionally, we
relied on the following selection criteria: (1) the ﬁrm's headquarters were at the time of sampling (year 2005) located in
the US or Europe, (2) the ﬁrm could be regarded a prominent case on the basis of the signiﬁcant size of the business
(annual revenue at least 1 billion USD at the time of sampling), and (3) the research team could gain high-level access
(speciﬁcally, interviewing current or former members of senior management as well as accessing sufﬁciently detailedComponent 
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Fig. 1. Research setting represented as ﬁrms along different stages of the value chain.
F. Hacklin et al. / Long Range Planning 51 (2018) 82e11086supplementary material). This resulted in a set of 14 prominent ﬁrms (for a descriptive overview see Fig. 1 and Table A1 in
the Appendix).
Data collection was focused on how ﬁrms responded to value migration. Speciﬁcally, we collected data in terms of
customer value proposition, distribution channel, customer segment, and revenue streams in Era 1 (business model before value
migration) as well as in Era 2 (business model after value migration) in order to capture the ﬁrms’ business models (see Table
A1 in the Appendix).1,2
We used interviews as the primary method for collecting data because they provide a rich account of informants’
experience and knowledge (Fontana and Frey, 1994; Holstein and Gubrium, 1997). We conducted interviews with senior and
middle managers from all ﬁrms. In total, we conducted 37 formal interviews and 31 informal conversations. All the interviews
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Interviews were organized along a semi-structured guideline and conducted either
in person or over the phone. The interview duration was typically 1 h, and we were able to conduct follow-up conversations
(often by email) to ﬁll gaps in the data. Informants were identiﬁed and contacted either using the social networking platform
LinkedIn or through our personal contacts. Additional informants were identiﬁed following a snowballing principle
(Biernacki andWaldorf, 1981). In addition to interviews, we collected secondary archival data from ﬁrms, e.g., annual reports
and presentations pertaining to strategic challenges. Further, for each company, relevant academic articles and teaching case
studies were revisited. Moreover, for seven of the ﬁrms, the authors had privileged access as a result of prior employment
relationships, consulting assignments, or executive education programs. Interactionwith case ﬁrmswas eased by the fact that
the authors were based in Silicon Valley and Scandinavia during the observation perioddregions at the forefront of the
converging telecom and computer industries. This procedure of collecting data from both primary and secondary sources was
iterated until saturation was reached and we had sufﬁcient information to describe the case as well as the change in all
components of the primary business model for each ﬁrm (Miles and Huberman, 1994). For an overview of data collected, see
Table 1.Data analysis
The data analysis followed a four-step approach. First, we wrote up short narratives on how the ﬁrms were affected by
value migration. Second, for each ﬁrm, we described the ﬁrm's focal business model during Era 1 and how the business
model changed during Era 2. Speciﬁcally, we described all business models in terms of customer value proposition, dis-
tribution channels, customer segments, and revenue models. To do this, we developed sub-level coding elements that were
assigned to the data (see Fig. 2). An initial list of sub-level elements was developed by reviewing the business model
literature and was subsequently extended, reﬁned, and condensed as data analysis proceeded. The ﬁrst round of manual
coding was performed by one author and was validated through discussion, modiﬁcation and reﬁnement involving all three
authors. Coding was performed manually, through color-coded annotations in the interview transcripts, as well as aggre-
gation in spreadsheets. Third, we analyzed business model innovation by tracing the changes in business model components
between Era 1 and Era 2 (see Table A1 in the Appendix). We then compared each ﬁrm's business model innovation with
known archetypes in the business model literature (see e.g. Markides and Charitou, 2004). As a result, each business model
innovation response was assigned the label ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’. Fourth, we assessed the outcome of each ﬁrm's
business model innovation by investigating the impact on the ﬁrm's ability to create and capture value, as well as changes in
its ﬁnancial performance.Validity and reliability
In the iterative process of collecting and analyzing our data, various measures were taken to ensure the quality of our
ﬁndings. Drawing on the suggestions provided by Gibbert and Ruigrok (2010), we followed a set of guidelines to strengthen
validity and reliability. First, themain research actions of this studywere centered on collection of interviewand archival data.
Our focal sources of data consisted of our informants, mostly senior managers and executives of each ﬁrm, who by virtue of
experience and respective roles in their organizations represent knowledgeable experts in the ﬁeld. To improve objectivity,
we complemented our analysis with statements and ﬁnancial ﬁgures from annual reports. Further, through documenting
how data was accessed, collected and analyzed, we constantly strived towards establishing a chain of evidence (see also
Eisenhardt, 1989). Finally, our research was designed as a multiple case study, situated in a well-deﬁned industry context,1 We deﬁne the business model as the logic and the activities that create and appropriate economic value as well as the link between value creation and
value capture. The business model describes how a ﬁrm takes resources, often in the form of technology, as inputs and converts them into economic
outputs through customers and markets, thereby connecting resource potential with the realization of economic value (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom,
2002). In so doing, the business model speciﬁes the following six elements: (1) what customer segments are being served, (2) what the customer value
proposition is, (3) which activities should be performed in-house and which outsourced, (4) how the ﬁrm conﬁgures its resources, (5) how the ﬁrm sells
and distributes its offering and creates value for the customer, and (6) how the ﬁrm proﬁts from these activities through its value-capture mechanism
(Bj€orkdahl, 2009).
2 These components correspond to a subset of the framework by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010), by excluding all components that do not refer to
activities of creating and capturing value. Moreover, this selection of components can be regarded as in line with prominent deﬁnitions by e.g., Magretta
(2002), which in prior works have been claimed to constitute exhaustive representations of a ﬁrm's business model.
Table 1
Overview of access to data collected for this study.
Value chain
activity
Firm Primary data ondary data
Formal interviews (n ¼ 37) Informal conversations
(n ¼ 31)
Site
visits
Other formal
interaction
chival data collected Academic/case studies revisited
Component
manufacturers
Intel Director (Santa Clara, 2006);
Director/General Manager
(phone, 2006); Senior Specialist
(phone, 2014)
Director (Boston, 2014) Yes nual reports, analyst
eﬁngs, trade press,
bsites
Burgelman and Grove (1996);
Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber
(2005); Chesbrough (2007);
Thomas and
Burgelman (2015)
Qualcomm Director (phone, 2006);
Senior Specialist (phone, 2014); Senior
Director (phone, 2014)
No nual reports,
alyst brieﬁngs,
de press, websites
Yofﬁe et al. (2004); Thomas and
Burgelman (2015)
Infrastructure
manufacturers
Cisco Director (phone, 2006); Vice
President/General Manager (phone,
2006); Former Director (phone, 2014)
Director (Zurich, 2012; 2013) Yes Workshop ernal documents,
nual reports, analyst
eﬁngs, trade press,
bsites
Brueller and Capron (2010)
Ericsson Vice President (phone, 2014) Senior Vice President
(Stockholm, 2005); Vice President
(London, 2008); Director
(Stockholm, 2014)
Yes Past
employment
ernal documents,
nual reports, analyst
eﬁngs, trade press,
bsites
Narayandas and
Beyersdorfer (2007a); (Narayandas
and Beyersdorfer, 2007b);
Birkinshaw
and Gibson (2004)
Device
manufacturers
Nokia Senior Manager (Mountain View,
2006); Senior Manager (Espoo, 2012);
Business Development Manager
(Espoo, 2012); Manager (phone,
2014); Director (phone, 2014)
Senior Manager (Helsinki,
2007; 2013); Director
(Lausanne, 2011); Former
Executive Vice President
(Helsinki, 2013)
Yes Workshop ernal documents,
nual reports, analyst
eﬁngs, trade press,
bsites
Doz and Kosonen (2010); Alcacer
et al. (2011a); Alcacer
et al., (2011b);
Wei-Ru and Gimeno, 2012
Aspara et al.
(2013); Vuori and Huy (2015)
Apple Manager (Cupertino, 2006); Manager
(Cupertino, 2006); Former Senior
Manager (Zurich, 2014)
Former Senior Manager
(Palo Alto, 2006); Director
(San Francisco, 2012)
Yes nual reports,
alyst brieﬁngs,
de press, websites
Thomke and Feinberg (2009);
Yofﬁe and Rossano (2012); Amit
and Zott (2012)
Palm Director (Palo Alto, 2006) Former Manager (Palo
Alto, 2006)
No nual reports,
alyst brieﬁngs,
de press, websites
Glynn and Spitzer (2005)
HP Vice President (phone, 2006); Former
Vice President (Zurich, 2014)
Former Vice President
(Zurich, 2010)
No Past
employment
nual reports,
alyst brieﬁngs,
de press, websites
Burgelman and Meza (2004)
Network
carriers
SonyEricsson Executive Vice President (phone,
2008); Director (phone, 2008);
Senior Manager (phone, 2014)
Executive Vice President
(Lund, 2007); Executive
Vice President (Lund, 2007)
Yes Consulting nual reports,
alyst brieﬁngs,
de press, websites
Cheng and Moi (2008)
TeliaSonera Manager (phone, 2014);
Senior Manager (phone, 2014)
Senior Manager (Stockholm,
2012); Manager (Stockholm,
Yes Consulting;
executive
education
ernal documents,
nual reports, analyst
Curwen (2006); Nystr€om (2007)
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Table 1 (continued )
Value chain
activity
Firm Primary data Secondary data
Formal interviews (n ¼ 37) Informal conversations
(n ¼ 31)
Site
visits
Other formal
interaction
Archival data collected Academic/case studies revisited
2012); Senior Manager (Helsinki,
2013)
brieﬁngs, trade press,
websites
Swisscom Director (Palo Alto, 2006; 2006);
Senior Manager (Zurich, 2014);
Manager (phone, 2014); Senior
Specialist (Zurich, 2014)
Senior Manager (Zurich, 2011;
2014); Senior Manager (Zurich,
2011); Vice President (Zurich,
2013); Senior Specialist (Zurich,
2014)
Yes Consulting Internal documents,
Annual reports, analyst
brieﬁngs, trade press,
websites
Vrdoljak et al. (2000); Kern
et al. (2007)
France
Telecom
President (phone, 2006);
Manager (phone, 2014);
Manager (phone, 2014)
No Annual reports,
analyst brieﬁngs,
trade press, websites
Burgelman and Schifrin (2011)
Value-added
service providers
Google Senior Director (Mountain
View, 2012)
Senior Engineer (Zurich, 2008);
Senior Director (Mountain View, 2011;
2012; 2013; 2014); Senior Engineer
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contributed to strengthening the validity of our ﬁndings (cf. Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010).
Second, in the process of collecting our data from these focal sources, we applied snowballing techniques. That is, we
continued to schedule new or follow-up interviews as well as to collect additional material for our fact base until saturation
was reached (see also Section Sampling and data collection). Further, we triangulated our initial ﬁndings with additional
sources of data, such as company-internal archival data, Internet research, and blogs to ensure our qualitative analysis
accurately captured the relationship between the ﬁrms’ actions and their contingent environment. We maintained a central
data repository for our case study research, containing all transcribed interviews, archival documents, discussion notes and
intermediate theory development accounts. Finally, we were able to keep our case analysis focusing on non-sensitive
company-speciﬁc information, which allowed us to have case ﬁrms to appear by their own name as opposed to treating
them anonymously. By applying these measures, we strove to enhance the reliability of our ﬁndings (cf. Gibbert and Ruigrok,
2010). In the following section, the results of the data analysis are presented.Findings: patterns of business model innovation
How can ﬁrms pursue businessmodel innovationwhen value is migrating across industries and between ﬁrms? To answer
this question, we analyzed four distinct patterns of business model innovation.Pattern 1. Secondary business model innovation under lower value migration
Avariety of ﬁrms in our samplewho found themselves in an environment of lower valuemigrationdYahoo, Intel, Ericsson,
TeliaSonera, Swisscom and France Telecomdpursued an approach of launching secondary business models in parallel to the
primary business model.While being exposed to new market conditions and a reconﬁguration of the industry environment,
ﬁrms’ mechanisms for value creation and value capture were only marginally affected. To capture value, these ﬁrms
essentially left their primary business model unchanged and set up new business models in parallel. For example, Intel
extended their offering toward mobile computing and launched a new unit that focused on developing technologies for
future mobile handsets. As one director at Intel reﬂected,“With our new ultramobile PC initiative, we are collaborating with Microsoft to develop mobile handsets, that allow
the full PC experience. […] But it is not about the PC, it is about communication: always connected, everywhere, every
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more radio technologies, but do not exactly know yet which ones.” (Interview)Ericsson, a market leader in mobile base stations, subsystems, and related billing solutions, perceived a risk of value
migrating away from the ﬁrm's business model unless they managed to widen their scope and gain a signiﬁcant foothold in
the Internet and computing space. In their annual report, the company pointed out:“Should we not succeed in understanding the market development or acquire the necessary competence or develop
andmarket products and solutions that are competitive in this changingmarket, our future results will suffer.” (Annual
report, 2007, p. 105).Ericsson responded to these challenges through a number of multimedia acquisitions, keeping their primary business
model around the design, manufacturing, and delivery of infrastructure equipment and services more or less unchanged.
Yahoo left their primary business model largely unchanged, but started to offer adjacent software-related services through
various isolated initiatives targeting niche segments, such as hosted services for small and mid-sized ﬁrms. A similar response
was chosen at TeliaSonera. The Scandinavian network operator started to offer adjacent businesses by, for example, exper-
imentingwith a newhotspot business to become the dominant supplier of such technology. France Telecomalso started to build
separate units based on newand local businesses. The network carrier Swisscom left their primary businessmodelmore or less
intact but launched a number of initiatives to capture some of the value that started tomigrate away from their legacy business.
Swisscom believed they needed to complement their traditional business model that relied on providing infrastructure access
with something else. However, they were undecided about the future direction of the ﬁrm. A manager at Swisscom explains:“Now, we need to start separating our businesses. [On the one hand,] infrastructure and access, a utility, like power and
water, has to simply ‘be there’. We call it ‘online oxygen,’ it is a bread-and-butter business, which belongs to the
infrastructure of every country. That is one option, but in the future one thousand people would be enough to run this
whole infrastructure for our country, including wholesale. [On the other hand,] the question is, does onewant to go one
step further and become a provider of services?” (Interview)To “go one step further,” Swisscom set up a corporate venturing unit for strategic investments into promising young
technology ﬁrms (interview), yet left them fairly isolated with respect to the ﬁrm's primary business model.
In all these cases, changes in the primary business model were relatively small to nonexistent and were related to mainly
changing revenue models, e.g., pay-per-minute, ﬂat rates, or capped usage. TeliaSonera introduced a uniﬁed model for
charging the customer across different services, where “you have a main subscription and then you have a ‘data bucket’ with an
extra ‘data sink’ for your iPhone or tablet, which actually has changed the way we are billing the customer” (interview). Swisscom,
in turn, launched the ‘inﬁnity’ pricing system, moving away from charging the customer for minutes or data units, but rather
for transmission speed.
All of these ﬁrms fared relatively well as they were situated in parts of the value chain were value migration was
comparatively lower (see Fig. 1). Intel succeeded in increasing their revenues substantially and at the same time increased
their operating margin and return on equity. Ericsson also succeeded in increasing their revenues but saw a large decline in
operating margins and return on equity. Among the mobile operators, there were different results. TeliaSonera and Swisscom
saw small changes in their revenues, operating margins, and return on equity. Worst off was the network carrier France
Telecom and the value-added service provider Yahoo that both saw a decline in revenues and operatingmargins (see Table 2).Pattern 2. Primary business model innovation under lower value migration
At the same time, a second group of ﬁrms in equally stable environments adopted a different response resulting in both
better and worse performance than the ﬁrst group of ﬁrms. This group of ﬁrmsdCisco, Google, and Qualcommdchose to
probe, pivot and implement substantial changes to their primary business models. For example, Cisco, a leader in designing,
developing, and distributing network equipment for the Internet and computer infrastructure (and a major competitor of
Ericsson) realized that it would not be sustainable to solely rely on their leading position in creating technical infrastructure.
This was because valuewas likely to becomemore volatile in the futurewith the risk of migrating towards other players in the
ecosystem. To meet these new challenges, Cisco decided to revamp their primary business model to support cross-functional
activities. A Cisco manager explained:“For years, we were in functional silos, and I think we did everything we could to optimize the functions. And we
recognized that the next level of productivity and the next level of innovation would come from a cross-functional
approach to building an integrated business model.” (Interview)Cisco started to increasingly try out different ways of launching vertical services for speciﬁc customer segments, drawing
on its technology, but turning it into more speciﬁc areas of application. The company also started to reach out directly to
consumers, ﬁrst, launching a network infrastructure-related education offering, and then gradually moving into video-
conferencing services. Currently, the company is aiming to become a dominant player in enabling distance education ser-
vices. Cisco's changes in the business model are quite different from those of Ericsson. While Ericsson has added several new
business areas, e.g., through the acquisition and integration of a video-conferencing manufacturer, while keeping their
Table 2
Summary of ﬁrms, value migration, business model innovation and ﬁnancial outcome.
Firm Value
migration
BM
innovation
Financial outcomea
Intel Low Secondary Succeeded to substantially increase its
revenues during the period (58% increase
from 2006 to 2014) and to increase its operating
margins. The ROE also increased over the period to 21% in 2014.
Qualcomm Low Primary Succeeded to have a remarkable growth in revenues
(250% increase from 2006 to 2014) with only a slightly
decreased operating margins (to 29% in 2014).
The ROE was kept around 20%.
Cisco Medium Primary Revenues decreased slightly with a minor increase in
operating margins (8% in 2014). The ROE also
decreased over the period.
Ericsson Medium Secondary Revenues improved over the period (28% increase from
2006 to 2014). However, the operating margin went down
heavily (from 20% in 2006 to 7% in 2014). The ROE decreased
substantially to 8% in 2014 from over 20% in 2006.
Nokia High Secondary Revenues decreased substantially from 2006 to 2012
(28%) in a growing market. Operating margin went from
13% in 2006 to 8% in 2012. Nokia sold off its handset
division to Microsoft in 2013 in order to get the company on feet.b
Apple High Primary Had a remarkable growth in revenues (850% increase from
2006 to 2014) and a remarkable growth in operating margin
(from 3% in 2006 to 29% in 2014). The ROE increased in a
remarkable way from 5% in 2006 to 35% in 2014.
Palm High Primary Saw strong decreases in revenues from 2006, and saw
decreases in operating margins and net income. From 2008
Palm was starting to make losses and in July 2010 HP
bought Palm for 1,2 billion USD.
HP High Secondary Had a growth in revenues (22% increase from 2006 to 2014)
and saw a small decline in operation proﬁts (down to
6% in 2014). Its ROE increased slightly to 19% in 2014.
SonyEricsson High Secondary Had remarkable decline in revenues and lost over half its
revenues from 2006 to 2011. The company went from net
margins of 12% in 2006 to loss making in 2011. In 2012,
Ericsson divested its 50% share of the company to Sony
following loss of competitive edge in mobiles.c
TeliaSonera Medium Secondary Increased its revenues slightly over the period
(11% increase from 2006 to 2014) with sustained
operating margin (about 26% in 2014). Its ROE increased
slightly over the period.
Swisscom Medium Secondary Increased its revenues over the period (21% increase
from 2006 to 2014) and saw a small decline in its
operating margins. Its ROE decreased to 31% in 2014,
but from very high levels.
France Telecom Medium Secondary Saw declined revenues (24% decline from 2006 to 2014)
and at the same saw a small decline in operating margin
to 12% in 2014. ROE dropped sharply from 15% in
2006 to 4% in 2014.
Google Low Primary Saw a remarkable growth in revenues (520% increase
from 2006 to 2014) with almost sustained operating
margins (25% in 2014). The ROE declined to 14% in 2014.
Yahoo Low Secondary Saw its revenues decline sharply (28% decline from 2006
to 2014). Its operating margins also declined sharply
and to as low as 3% in 2014. Its ROE increased to 19% in
2014 from 8% in 2006 mainly because of its sell of Alibaba shares.
a Financial outcome for observation period 2006e2014; Source: Companies' annual report; Return on Equity (ROE) is the corporation's success in using
the capital shareholders have invested to generate proﬁt. ROE is measured as the net income returned as a percentage of shareholder's equity.
b For a better comparison, Nokia's period is from 2006 to 2012, due to sales of handset division to Microsoft in September 2013.
c SonyEricsson's period is from 2006 to 2011. SonyEricsson was taken over by Sony in January 2012.
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becoming a full-ﬂedged service company. Instead of suddenly overhauling the primary business model, the process followed
more of a trial-and-error logic, that is, probing and rolling back each step if not successful, allowing the ﬁrm to pivot between
different business models. In comparison, Ericsson has complemented their primary business model of manufacturing and
distributing infrastructure equipment and added various related service offerings. Cisco, by contrast, transformed their
business model so that the manufacturing of network equipment has now become a means to an end, that is, subordinate to
delivering telecommunication services such as video conferencing.
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products and services. Gradually, the company evolved their primary business model from developing hardware to inte-
grating hardware and software into new value propositions. In turn, Google, the leading search engine company, sensed great
opportunities to extend their service offering, launching a number of new products connected to their platform. Similarly to
Cisco, all the initiatives were synchronized and strongly connected with the primary business modelddriving trafﬁc to the
search engine that supports the advertising revenue model, including the infrastructure and platforms supporting their core
business.
Thus far, we have established that ﬁrms exposed to minor forces of value migration fared relatively well. Both Qualcomm
and Google saw a remarkable growth in revenues (250 and 520 percent from 2006 to 2014, respectively) with sustained
margins and outperformed all the ﬁrms that respondedwith an additional and complementary businessmodel run in parallel
with the primary business model. An exception is Intel that saw a lower increase in revenue growth compared to the other
two ﬁrms, but saw a better outcome in operating margin and return on equity. Cisco, a ﬁrm that also pivoted their primary
business model, on the other hand, did not perform (on average) better than many of the ﬁrms that launched a secondary
business model that ran in parallel with the primary business model (see Table 2). Hence, the ﬁnancial outcome shows mixed
results compared to the other set of ﬁrms, and this set of ﬁrms fared from very (Qualcomm and Google) to relatively (Cisco)
well. In the following sections, we elaborate how this relationship unfolds in environments of higher value migration.
Pattern 3. Secondary business model innovation under higher value migration
Nokia, SonyEricsson, and HP are cases in point. In the case of HP, value started tomigrate from their traditional PC business
towards online offers. HP complemented their primary business model of selling computing and printing hardware with an
ecosystem for online digital photo printing, free online photo albums, and free photo-sharing services. In the words of a
former director at HP:“HP had a similar starting point to Apple. However, the main difference in my view is that HP lacked the platform
structure and the software competence… HPwas not a software company and really sucks at software, so that was one
component that was missing.” (Interview)The company responded to the challenge, yet essentially left the existing hardware business model of HP unchanged.“We made changes for sure, but I did not see any changes in the principal business model. Instead, we just added new
product and business lines. We did not do anything to change the existing value propositions to the customers. Apple
changed many things with their principal business model when they went digital; they changed the value proposition,
distribution through Appstore, and their revenue streams among other things… HP made a couple of big mistakes and
missed a couple of turns.” (Interview)Nokia, a device manufacturer that for a long time dominated the mobile handset industry, was traditionally running a
“vertical business model” (former strategy executive at Nokia, archival data). The vertical business model was based on a
strong component supply chain and well-established sales of their mobile device products to mobile operators, business, and
private customers worldwide. The company's senior executives envisioned value migration towards software and services
already in the late 1990s (see also Doz and Kosonen, 2010; Vuori and Huy, 2015). As a result, the company launched “Club
Nokia” in 1998 and integrated user-generated content and community collaboration into the service offering. They also
launched a ﬁrst-generation smartphone, a foldable phone with full QWERTY keyboard already back in 1997, allowing more
complex software, including various simpliﬁed ofﬁce applications to be installed on it. Yet, at earlier phases of the value
migration, these new efforts were kept relatively separate from their hugely successful primary business model, which
consisted of the sales of feature phones for the consumer market and which represented the source of all volumes and
margins. At the same time, while the new service paradigm slowly emerged with the introduction of a highly successful
business smartphone in 2005, and a sensationally popular consumer smartphone in 2007, the company was convinced that
the new competing players entering the mobile phone businessdApple or Samsungdwould remain marginal. Further, Nokia
managers for a long time believed that they had found the winning business model, that is,“[our] management believed that it had found the ‘recipe for success’ [consisting of] global logistics plus a broad range
of products,” which “prevented it from acknowledging that service was the businessduntil too late” (former strategy
executive at Nokia, archival data).In response, top management focused all their efforts on the primary business model which was built on economies of
scale, where the company's “culture and management systems supported volumes and a large product range” (former
strategy executive at Nokia, archival data). Yet, as the value to be captured in that industrymigratedmore or less entirely away
from the hardware devices toward software and ‘apps,’ Nokia ended up struggling to execute their primary business model
proﬁtably. None of the complementing efforts had paid off, particularly as focus was directed away from them back to the
primary business model as times got tough.
Similarly to Nokia, although many years earlier, SonyEricsson turned out to be even less successful in fending off value
migrating away from the handset market. After some minor attempts to build some businesses to complement their cellular
phones, the company ultimately failed to create and capture value from their primary business model.
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capture value. HP was the only ﬁrm that succeeded in increasing their revenues, but at the same time suffered from low
operating margin (6 percent in 2014). For Nokia and SonyEricsson, their responses were disastrous in terms of creating and
capturing value as shown by their ﬁnancial outcome (see Table 2). Both ﬁrms saw a remarkable decline in revenues and went
from prospering ﬁrms to loss-making ﬁrms with severe problems for their owners.
Pattern 4. Primary business model innovation under higher value migration
Apple, on the other hand, successfully adapted their primary business model to be at par with a rapidly changing business
environment. Apple realized that as computing and mobile technologies converged, value would start to migrate toward
smarter devices and services. As they were at that time strongly in a device business related to personal computers (the Mac
and later the iMac), in response the company started to pivot their primary businessmodel. Initiating a number of such pivots,
Apple launched the iPod in an effort to bring music experience through a new form of MP3 players to a wider consumer
market on the basis of a simpler and slicker user interface:“…if you look at current users, we have to design for a grandma.” (Interview)As this business seemed to take off, the company started experimenting with an online music store allowing music to be
purchased directly from the digital device. This, again, was verywell accepted by consumers and turned out to be a catalyst for
selling the iPod player itself. Very soon, far more revenuewas generated by the onlinemusic store than by iPod device sales. A
couple of years later, the company decided to widen their product portfolio to enter the mobile phone business. Against
mainstream analyst and the incumbents’ expectations, the company was able to capture a remarkable market share from a
handful of established players on the market, as their product offering was different enough from existing smartphones. As
one manager reﬂected,“I would like to say that it was pre-emptive visionary thinking, but it wasn't. It was more reacting. It wasn't that we
were completely wrong. But it was more that this is the way the market is heading and the consumer market has
changed quickly.” (Interview)A few years later, just after the prominent global launch of the iPhone, the company pulled off the same trick as with their
iPod players: introducing another online store to try out a new way of getting consumers to access content and buy software
for their smartphone devices. This online software store initially followed a closed model, that is, only allowing applications
developed by Apple to be sold. After several months of consumer complaints, the company decided to open up their online
software store, allowing anyone to develop, promote, and earn money with software using the company's store. This model
turned out to be exceptionally successful and within a short time catapulted the sales of the smartphone device into a leading
position on the market. Again, the true cash cow was the combination of an online software store with the smartphone
device, not the device itself. Yet, as the company's services are strongly integrated across all the devices in their portfolio, the
company has found a winning model to lock the consumer into Apple's device family which, in turn, allows the company to
sustain higher margins on the devices. Hence, in less than a decade, the company introduced a variety of different new device
families in combination with online store conceptsdsome of them more successful right away, others requiring tweaking
here and there. As one manager described this experimentation culture:“There is a famous quote fromone of our executives that says, ‘Perfection has very poor ROI’. I mean it's now everything,
[…] a pragmatic aspect. We have very short [development] cycles. If you look historically we are maybe 18 months on
average and that seems obscene. I mean you can't get a lot of stuff done during that time. There is a pragmatic aspect as
far as solving the 80 or 90 percent case and making sure [it works]. […] if you look at design, details around tweaking
value, across the enterprise there is a profession in that as far as they admit.” (Interview)What sets Apple apart from many other ﬁrms is how they managed to consistently adapt and amend their primary
business model so that various business model elements supported each other. The business model can be described as
relatively simple: belonging to the Apple ecosystem creates value for customers through access to and sharing of content,
simplicity of use etc. Apple then appropriates large portions of that value through premium-priced hardware and by con-
trolling the distribution of content (e.g., music and apps) (see also, e.g., Thomke and Feinberg, 2009). For example, Apple was
instrumental in creating a market for wireless speakers through their Airplay standard. A former Apple engineer told us:“Apple (and Cisco) licensed the technology [Airplay] for free to anyone who wanted to implement it […] and that was
creating a new market.” (Interview)In short, Apple's repeated changes to their primary business model resulted in a novel one where all parts of the business
are interrelated through their software and online store. In so doing, the company has an integrated business model with the
purpose of integrating the same customer segment into new products and services rather than building completely separated
businesses focusing on entirely new customer segments. Apple's measures resulted in value starting to migrate towards the
company, which also is reﬂected in its remarkable growth path (see Table 2).
Others were not as proactive. A case in point is Palm that only reacted to migrating value at a very late stage when their
businessmodel had already been unsuccessful for awhile. As a result, Palmwasmore or less forced to change the very essence
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obsolete. Palm operated a business model based on portable handsets, at that time so-called personal digital assistants
(PDAs), aimed at assisting their users with personal information management (PIM) such as calendars and contacts. Previ-
ously, PIM data was synchronized with a desktop PC through a cable or docking station. The business model consisted of
selling the device and related software as a standalone product. The increasing pressure from communication technologies
forced Palm to think about integrating communication features into their handsets, either through entering the emerging
smartphone market or through ﬁnding other ways to complement their knowledge base with the emerging requirements.
However, instead of turning their devices into full-ﬂedged communication and PIM tools, a platform-oriented model was
created, opening up for third-party vendors to build on the emerging smartphone and software ecosystem. The trans-
formation from traditional handset equipment vending into the building of an ecosystem was based on the premise of
achieving a mediating role between devices, telecommunications, and the emerging ecosystems.“The challenges then were how do we create and leverage models so that rivals feel that ‘we're in line with them,’ we
add value to what they're doing, we're not just about ‘what business are you working on, thank you very much, and I
can add it to my pipeline.’” (Interview)Hence, Palm was no longer a sole supplier of PDA devices to someone who would have combined these with commu-
nication facilities and related software applications but instead embraced the competition from both worlds, i.e., mobile
handsets and application software, to build a model based on bridging them. Along with this transition, Palm gradually gave
up on their own software operating system, PalmOS, and started shipping devices running operating systems by mainstream
providers, with the promise of getting access to the software ecosystem and communication facilities they offered. This
transition was, apparently, perceived as a major loss of the company's prior usability advantage, despite new technologies
such as web browsers, email, or an integrated phone.“When we had reviews of this device, people said, ‘Well, it's pretty good, it's almost as good as a [your old device]!’
We're competing against ourselves.” (Interview)Following this, the company tried to go back to their original model, shipping devices with an updated version of their
proprietary operating system. In parallel, the company started to develop an open source-based operating system, which
would open up to content from the Linux ecosystem. While initially gaining much respect from their peers, the platformwas
compromised through technical ﬂaws and hardware problems. At this point in time, the advantage gained by other players in
the smartphone arenawas already becomingmassive. As a result, Palm lost their power and advantage based on their original
customer value proposition (e.g., their intuitive user interface) as synchronizationwith computers had become a commodity.
In this new situation, Palm's value proposition was destroyed and value migrated to other players. Piece by piece, Palm lost
market share and eventually went out of business.
For an overview of the patterns identiﬁed, see Fig. 3. Table 2 shows a summary of ﬁrms, their valuemigration context, their
choice of business model innovation, as well as the high-level changes in ﬁrm performance.Business model innovation
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This paper has brought together ﬁrm-level research on business models and industry-level research on value migration to
examine patterns of business model innovation. Ourmain goal was to investigate how business model innovation plays out in
dynamic environments where value is migrating rapidly between ﬁrms. Three main observations can be made. First, under
great degrees of value migration, pivoting the primary business model improves value creation and value capture at a greater
rate than launching new secondary business models that run in parallel to the primary one. Second, proactively pivoting the
primary business model is more likely to generate adequate value creation and value capture than reactive changes to the
primary business model. Third, under lesser degrees of value migration, launching secondary business models may very well
sustain or even improve value creation and value capture. Beyond these patterns and observations, in the following section,
we will advance a broader theory of the mechanisms that produce these results (for an overview, see Table 3). Unpacking
these mechanisms allows us to discuss contingencies for the main strategies outlined in the literature on business model
innovationdespecially in terms of limitations to the practice of parallel business models.
Firm-market matching is a mechanism that operates as a link between the focal ﬁrm's internal environment (in the form
of resources and capabilities) and the external environment (in the form of market characteristics and demand conditions).
A ﬁrm can rely on primary and secondary business model innovation in its pursuit to ﬁnding a better match between
capabilities and changing environmental conditions. For example, a ﬁrm may very well set up parallel business organi-
zations with separate sales organizations to take advantage of new technologies that the main business model and sales
organization fail to cater for (as Ericsson did). In contrast, pivoting the primary business model allows the ﬁrm to integrate
and embed new value-creating activities with the primary business model (as Cisco did). Pivoting the primary business
model also allows ﬁrms to undergo iterative cycles of learning and experimentation to properly match ﬁrm capabilities with
market needs, thereby lowering the risk of strategic failure in both the short and long term (Casadesus-Masanell and
Tarzijan, 2012). The higher the degree of value migration, the more important it is to succeed with ﬁrm-marketTable 3
Examples for mechanisms.
Mechanism Example
Firm-market matching Cisco pursued an approach of pivoting its primary business model, allowing
the ﬁrm to iteratively learn, embed, and integrate new value-creating
activities related to video-conferencing software and services to match
needs of a growing global market.
Ericsson followed an approach of establishing a secondary business model,
seeking to improve more short-term market ﬁt through taking advantage
of new technologies that the main business model and sales organization
failed to cater for.
By opening up a new unit focusing on mobile computing devices,
Intel followed an approach of setting up secondary business models. Running
different business models in parallel allowed Intel to match new market
needs by venturing into activities that were rather distant from its primary
business model.
Resource re-deployment Following ﬁrst successes of its online music store being well received on the
market, Apple pivoted its primary business model, which allowed it to
deploy further resources to boosting software development. This
strengthened its hardware experiences through offering a seamless platform
for content distribution.
Nokia followed an approach of innovating in a secondary business model
and largely continued with business as usual for its primary business model.
This caused the detached business model with its tied and inherited resources
to over time lose their ﬁt with the external environment.
Attention steering Cisco and Google, who both changed their primary business models,
allowed the top management to direct its attention to the new
business model initiatives (video conferencing and device ecosystem,
respectively), which in turn helped securing resources.
Nokia and Sony Ericsson, who both established secondary business models,
experienced difﬁculties in internally making the case for further
investing into their secondary business models (mobile operating
system and mobile handsets, respectively), until it was too late
(“burning platform”, Nokia press release)
Complexity de-escalation By adhering to a pivoting approach, Qualcomm implemented the
integrated platform business model through sequentially substituting
parts of its primary business model, thereby keeping complexity of
managing the change lower than if it had opted for parallel business models.
Ericsson invested into several separated, secondary business models,
mostly through acquisitions. While this initially offered a fast way
to expand into new activities, the cost of coordinating and integrating
these into the primary business model grew out of hand, leading the ﬁrm
to disinvest several of these ventures.
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However, in environments with lower degrees of value migration, where the ﬁrm's primary business model is not under
threat, secondary business models that run in parallel is an effective way to explore newmarket opportunities with minimal
changes to the ﬁrm's asset base. In fact, in such an environment, changing the primary business model may very well be a
riskier choice because of potential switching costs and resource inefﬁciencies. Needless to say, changing the primary
business model constrains the ﬁrm's ability to diversify into new business models. In the quest for growth, business model
diversiﬁcation may be a way to spread the value creation and value capture activities and grow the ﬁrm in a new direction.
If the ﬁrm undertakes the parallel approach, it may give rise to more freedom in terms of business model diversiﬁcation.
Similarly, pivoting the primary business model constrains the ﬁrm's search for and implementation of distant business
models. Put differently, pivoting the primary business model is riskier the more distant search the ﬁrm pursues. Launching
secondary business models in parallel, though, increases the likelihood of ﬁnding performance peaks distant from the ﬁrm's
primary business model, but without jeopardizing the primary business model. For example, Intel opened up a new unit
focusing on mobile computing devices. As the ﬁrm's environment was relatively stable, running parallel secondary business
models turned out to be fruitful as this allowed the company to venture into activities that were rather distant from its
primary business model. The search for distant business models is also more likely to build new knowledge and capabilities
(Laamanen and Wallin, 2009). In environments characterized by relatively low value migration and where the primary
business model is not threatened, parallel business models thus provide ample room to experiment with both related and
unrelated business model diversiﬁcation.
Resource redeployment refers to a mechanism explaining the differential outcomes of business model responses. In
particular, resource redeployment underscores the advantage of pivoting the primary business model when value has the
potential to rapidly migrate away from the ﬁrm. When value is migrating, the ﬁrm's ability to create and capture value is
immediately threatened (Slywotzky, 1996). Hence, the chances are greater that inherited resources will become obsolete.
Under such circumstances, the ﬁrm needs to be agile in redeploying substantial resources (Penrose, 1959). Launching sec-
ondary business models in parallel then holds less promise as it only provides marginal changes to the primary business
model. As a result, inherited resources tied to the primary business modeldwhich have the greatest effect on perform-
ancedrisk becoming outdated. The different outcomes for Nokia and Apple form a case in point. Whereas Apple deployed
resources on complementing software with their hardware to build a seamless platform for content distribution, Nokia
largely continued with business as usual for their primary business model, which caused the business model and the
inherited resources to lose their ﬁt with the external environment over time. Pivoting the primary business model, though,
allows the ﬁrm to rapidly deploy or redeploy critical resources to where they are most urgently needed. When value migrates
at a high pace, substantial changes in the primary business modeldnot isolated experimentationdis required. In environ-
ments of lower value migration, however, where the need for resource redeployment may not seem evident at ﬁrst sight,
ﬁrms may fare equally well through resorting to a parallel secondary business model.
Attention steering is a mechanism that, similar to resource redeployment, underscores the advantage of pivoting the
primary business model in environments characterized by high degrees of value migration. Both approaches to business
model innovation allow the ﬁrm to redeploy resources. However, if the ﬁrm keeps new business models structurally separate,
the units are factually decoupled from the ‘parent’ company's rules, resources, and social relationships. Although structural
separation may initially seem feasible (e.g., Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) it steers decision-maker attention (e.g., Ocasio,
1997) away from potentially rewarding solutions. This is because managerial attention is generally directed to larger prob-
lems ﬁrstdin other words, the primary business modeldalthough an embryonic solution may reside in a parallel secondary
business model and remain undetected. Put differently, as managers' decisions are a result of limited cognitive capacity
(March and Simon, 1958), those business models run in parallel are easier to kill: they are overshadowed by the need to save
the ﬁrm's primary business model, which may seem to address a more burning issue at that moment, regardless of the
promise of the secondary business model. Again, Nokia is a prime example as top management continued to frame their
business in terms of number of sold devices, although the market had shifted towards competing ecosystems. The gravity of
this situation is underscored in business environments where managerial attention needs to be quickly steered toward
ﬁnding ﬁrm-wide solutions to value migration. Pivoting the primary business model forces the entire organization to pursue
an updated business model and, thus, managerial attention is more naturally steered to where pressing problems reside
(Chandler, 1962).
Complexity de-escalation is another mechanism that leads to the differential outcomes. Its opposite, i.e., the escalation of
complexity is the mechanismwhereby the ﬁrm over time commits to an increasing number of different businesses, markets,
and organizational forms. Although not harmful at the outset, when complexity starts to escalate and grow rapidly, it leads to
worsened organizational performance due to coordination costs (Chandler, 1962, 1992; Penrose, 1959). In other words, while
running a secondary business model has few detrimental effects when kept at bay, the downside grows as it allows for several
parallel attempts, whereas pivoting does not. Too many parallel attempts to change the business model increase organiza-
tional complexity andmakes it difﬁcult to draw on shared resources that do not necessarily provide a ﬁt with the complete set
of business models. For example, Ericsson entered themultimedia industry (mostly bymeans of acquiring other ﬁrms), which
had only a loose connection to their primary business model. In particular, complexity risks to escalate, accelerate, and grow
when the chosen business model response does not allow for the necessary depth of learning. Even when ﬁrms are not
running several business models in parallel but experiment with different complements one after the other (i.e., the purest
form of parallel business models), there is a risk of escalating organizational complexity. There are two reasons for such
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multiple attempts at parallel business models leave traces that over time risk accumulating into a set of unrelated organi-
zational memories. In contrast, pivoting the primary business model avoids complexity growing out of hand. Shifting the
entire ﬁrm toward a new business model, the organization experiences fewer obstacles in the form of coordination costs and
conﬂicting organizational memories, and can instead dedicate its resources to the search for synergies and
complementarities.
Contributions to theory and practice
The identiﬁed patterns of business model innovation provide a number of implications for theory and practice. First, we
identify four underlying mechanisms (ﬁrm-market matching, resource redeployment, attention steering and complexity de-
escalation) that explain the outcome of business model innovation strategies. Prior literature provides only limited evidence
on how business model innovation and heterogeneity affect ﬁrm performance (Aversa et al., 2015). We provide initial ex-
planations on why pivoting the primary business model is superior to launching secondary parallel business models when
value is migrating rapidly. For example, pivoting the primary business model improves the product-market ﬁt because it
allocates managerial attention and critical resources more effectively (than running parallel business models) and without
escalating organizational complexity. Our results are in line with the literature on dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 2007). Speciﬁcally, the underlying mechanisms provide the ﬁrm with the “asset
orchestration” capability necessary to manage deep uncertainty in dynamic environments (Teece and Leih, 2016). Similarly,
our work underscores the need for sensing, seizing and transforming capabilities as suggested by the dynamic capability
literature.
Second, we contribute by providing a ‘situated account’ of business model innovation in terms of how the external
environment affects the ﬁrm's business model. While prior research has investigated how business model innovation may
improve proﬁtability, market share, and competitive position (Bj€orkdahl, 2009; Sosna et al., 2010), we demonstrate how
industry-level forces in terms of value migration (Jacobides and MacDufﬁe, 2013; Slywotzky, 1996) affect the outcome of
business model strategies. For example, we corroborate how the urgency of changing the ﬁrm's primary business model is
dependent upon the ﬁrm's position in the value chain. In other words, ﬁrms in the same industry may experience very
different exposure to value migration and, thus, urgency for change. Analyzing the computer and telecommunications in-
dustries, we show that while ﬁrms upstream and downstream experienced comparatively low degrees of value migration
combined with new strategic opportunities, ﬁrms positioned in the middle of the value chain experienced remarkably higher
value migration forcing them to innovate their business models. Yet, ﬁrms are not completely at the peril of technology but
inﬂuence their fate by pursuing different business model innovation strategies. All in all, our paper takes the ﬁrst steps to-
wards connecting ﬁrm-level business model research with industry-level research on technical change (cf. Abernathy and
Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994a; Dosi, 1984; Carlsson, 1997; Jacobides and MacDufﬁe, 2013; Slywotzky, 1996; see e.g.
Christensen et al., 2005 for a similar apporach exposing the open innovation concept to industrial dynamics).
Third, our ﬁndings contribute to the issue of parallel business models. A powerful stream of research advocates the
operation of multiple, parallel, and partly even conﬂicting business models as a way to hedge risks and opportunities
(Casadesus-Masanell and Tarzijan, 2012; Markides and Charitou, 2004; Markides, 2013). Our analysis of the computer and
telecommunications industries provides supporting evidence for parallel business models in environments characterized by
lower degrees of value migration. In such environments, secondary business models offer a low-risk strategy to expand the
scope of the ﬁrm, without disturbing a well-functioning primary business model. When there is no urgent need for rapid
ﬁrm-market matching, pivoting may instead expose the ﬁrm to unnecessary risk. However, in environments where value is
rapidlymigrating away from the ﬁrm, the primary business model is already threatened. The greatest risk is then to shield the
primary business model. In environments of high value migration, creating parallel business models can create an illusion of
control when, in fact, the ﬁrm is only postponing an urgent decision to change its primary business model. Under such
conditions, pivotingdsequentially substituting the ﬁrm's primary business modeldis more likely to save the company, or
even allow it to prosper. However, in environments of lower value migration the need for fundamental change is less pressing
and experimentation through secondary business models that run in parallel to the primary business model may be a viable
strategy, and may even become advantageous as ﬁrms can pursue more distant search without risking the primary business
model.
Fourth, our work also provides a number of implications for practice. As managers decide on and implement business
model innovation, our work offers actionable insight into the opportunities and threats associated with dynamic environ-
ments. When value is migrating rapidly across industries and between ﬁrms e due to e.g., industry convergence or digital
disruption e managers must quickly assess whether the ﬁrm's business model is threatened or not. For such situations, the
ﬁndings of this study provide the basis for simple, yet effective decision-making heuristics. Should the ﬁrm's primary
business model be seriously threatened, managers are advised to proactively search for and implement an updated business
model that provides a better ﬁt with the new value landscape. Postponing a major overhaul of the primary business model or
attempting to implement new business models that run in parallel will not sufﬁce. However, when value is migrating at a
slower rate e and most likely not immediately threatening the effectiveness of the ﬁrm's business model e managers have
more discretion over how to act. In such situations, both business model innovation strategies may provide opportunities for
growth, but launching parallel business models is generally a less risky strategy than meddling with a well-functioning
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associated with primary and secondary business models. Finally, managers are advised to assess the opportunities associated
with value migration. Correctly timed and managed, a changing environment can become a treasure trove of opportunities.
Our work is not without limitations. While we developed a parsimonious model, where business model innovation
strategies and patterns of value migration explain value creation and value capture, we acknowledge that other factors may
inﬂuence these relationships. For example, the literature on industrial organization and innovation (e.g., Tirole, 1988; Teece,
1986; Porter, 1981; Scherer and Ross, 1990 explains e.g., how market power, substitution and complementarities affect the
ability of ﬁrms to proﬁt. It may very well be that a ﬁrm with superior market power or a long history as a supplier of critical
components is less exposed to the perils of value migration in the industry. Our work is also limited in terms of idiosyncrasies
between the empirical setting and the generalizability of results. For example, some industries are characterized by strong
path-dependency and ﬁrms may then be constrained in their abilities to pursue business model innovation. Future research
could therefore examine value migration and business model responses in other empirical settings. Another limitation is that
we cannot fully rule out that the only relationship to ﬁnancial outcome is the effectiveness of the business model. Even if we
deﬁne the business model as the link between how ﬁrms create and capture value, there might be other explanations for the
changes in ﬁnancial outcome that are dependent on external contingencies outside the role of the ﬁrm's business model. On
the other hand, given that we have studied ﬁrms in the same industry, this risk should be limited. Another limitation of our
work is the lack of direct observation of customers' reactions to business model innovation. Future work should strive for
collecting data from customers to avoid such bias. Finally, we have assumed that ﬁrms rely on their own competences for
business model innovation. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to explore how ﬁrms draw on external partners to
pursue open business model innovation (Chesbrough, 2013). Potentially, there are open business model conﬁgurations that
equally well can protect ﬁrms from the perils of rapid value migration.Acknowledgements
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APPENDIXTable A1
Detailed account of business model innovation.
Firm Era 1 business model Era 2 business model BM innovation Selected quotes
Intel Summary Design and manufacture
of chipsets for the
computing industry
Extending offering towards
mobile computing.
Launching new unit
focusing on developing
technologies for mobile
handsets and
experimenting with new
device prototypes.
Secondary “It's not all about merging all
these radio technologies, but
rather about how to get them
onto a platform that
additionally is open for new
innovations coming down the
pipeline. We need an
architecture, a platform, that is
not stuck and needs
innovation.” (interview)
“We are now in the third
incarnation of the ﬁrm. Intel 1.0
was the DRAM company. Intel
2.0 was the microprocessor
company. Now, here we are,
Intel 3.0, the platform
company.” (interview)
“Now, the convergence from
Intel's perspective has really
been about embracing this
opportunity as telco services,
data services, communications,
and IT convergence; we see a
tremendous business
opportunity.” (interview)
Table A1 (continued )
Firm Era 1 business model Era 2 business model BM innovation Selected quotes
Customer
value
proposition
Provisioning of
cost-effective processing and
related semiconductor chipset
equipment for manufacturers of
computing systems (PC and
servers)
Provisioning of cost-
effective processing and
related semiconductor
chipset equipment for
manufacturers of
computing systems (PC and
servers) as well as for
emerging mobile
computing domain (e.g.,
smartphones); offering
software and services based
on integrated platform
combining multiple
convergence-related
technologies
Distribution channels OEMs, ODMs, retail OEMs, ODMs, retail, online
Customer segments PC device manufacturers,
buyers of PC components
PC and mobile handset
device manufacturers,
buyers of PC components,
tablets, smartphones,
automobiles, automated
factory systems, medical
devices
Revenue model One-off sales One-off sales, service/
maintenance income
Qualcomm Summary Design and manufacture
of chipsets for the mobile
phone industry
Continuing design and
manufacture of chipsets for
the mobile phone industry,
yet experimenting with
means of involving third-
party developers through
open platform. Gradually
moving from sole hardware
provider to combined
hardware and software
provider.
Primary “[We] have this technology
called [MEDIATEC], that's a
mobile broadcast service, we're
now doing everything else than
building phones… but also
build a lot of equipment from
the broadcast layers… acquired
the licenses for spectrum… and
set up a new company, called
[MEDIATEC].” (interview)
The company introduced “an
open applications platform for
CDMA-based wireless devices.
Designed to provide solutions
for the wireless industry as it
moves toward wireless-
Internet convergence, the […]
platform enables software
developers to more easily
create and monetize feature-
rich applications for CDMA
devices and provides users with
the opportunity to download
applications 'over the air' and
personalize their wireless
devices to suit their needs.”
(archival data)
The company introduced an
“advanced mobile
microprocessor delivering
[signiﬁcantly higher]
processing speed and
unmatched power efﬁciency.
[This product] is the ﬁrst
microprocessor speciﬁcally
designed and optimized for
integration into [the company's
existing] solutions, and enables
the convergence of mobile
handsets with consumer
electronics features.” (archival
data)
The company introduced a
“platform […] and offers an
unprecedented combination of
(continued on next page)
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Firm Era 1 business model Era 2 business model BM innovation Selected quotes
mobile data processing,
multimedia performance, 3G
wireless connectivity, and the
lowest levels of power
consumption for all-day battery
life. The […] platform delivers
an instant-on and always-
connected user experience,
opening up a new era of
innovative computing and
consumer wireless mobile
devices.” (archival data)
Customer
value
proposition
Provisioning of modular,
cost-effective processing
capability
together with related
semiconductor
components for manufacturers
of mobile phones
Provisioning of modular,
cost-effective processing
capability together with
related semiconductor
components for
manufacturers of mobile
handsets and consumer
electronics; offering
integrated platform
combining multiple
convergence-related
technologies
Distribution channels OEM OEM, partnering with
major developer of
smartphone software
Customer segments Mobile phone manufacturers Mobile handset and
consumer electronics
manufacturers
Revenue model One-off sales One-off sales
Cisco Summary Pioneering the Internet through
enabling the underlying
network
and transport technologies
Building on its strong
infrastructure install base,
the company started to
increasingly try out
different ways of launching
vertical services for speciﬁc
customer segments. First,
network infrastructure-
related education, then
video conferencing
services. Currently, the
company is aiming to
become a dominant player
in enabling distance
education services.
Primary “For years, we were in the
functional silos, and I think that
we did everything we could to
optimize the functions. And we
recognize that the next level of
productivity, and the next level
of innovation, is coming from a
cross-functional approach.”
(interview)
“We are also seeking to
capitalize on this market
transition through the
development of other cloud-
based product and service
offerings through which we
intend to enable customers to
develop and deploy their own
cloud-based IT solutions,
including software-as-a-service
(SaaS) and other-as-a-service
(XaaS) solutions.”
“Other market transitions on
which we are focusing
particular attention include
those related to the increased
role of video, collaboration, and
networked mobility
technologies. The key market
transitions relative to the
convergence of video,
collaboration, and networked
mobility technologies, which
we believe will drive
productivity and growth in
network loads, appear to be
evolving even more quickly and
more signiﬁcantly than we had
previously anticipated. […]
TelePresence systems are one
example of product offerings
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that have incorporated video,
collaboration, and networked
mobility technologies, as
customers evolve their
communications and business
models. We are focused on
simplifying and expanding the
creation, distribution, and use
of end-to-end video solutions
for businesses and consumers.”
(AR 2011)
“We will always be a
networking company. I think
that we are saying that network
is the platform, and what
happened in voice is becoming
an offering all for that platform.
[…] One of these next verticals
on that platform will be video.”
(interview)
“We're also, though, looking to
make it increasingly relevant,
so there are more and more
vertical initiatives at [our
company]. And those vertical
initiatives, I think that, it's very
hard to go from a box selling
sales force, to a solution selling
one.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Powering the Internet through
infrastructure technology,
based on
designing, developing,
manufacturing, and
distributing network
equipment
Solving network
infrastructure tasks
through integrated
software, service and
product platforms; offering
telepresence and distance
learning solutions and
ecosystem; providing IT-
related education services
Distribution channels Direct sales, retail Direct sales, retail
Customer segments B2B B2C, B2B
Revenue model One-off sales One-off sales, fees for
education service
Ericsson Summary Manufacturing and delivering
of
application and services,
components for
ﬁxed broadband access,
components for
core networks and components
for mobile
broadband access.
Manufacturing and
delivering networks, global
services, and multimedia.
The components and
services were much the
same although the
company had gone more
into multimedia. This was
done mainly through the
acquisition of ﬁrms. The
established business model
was the same.
Secondary “Industry convergence between
telecom, data, and media
represents opportunities but
also risks. We are affected by
market conditions within the
telecommunications industry.
We are also affected by the
convergence of the telecom,
data, and media industries,
which is largely driven by
technological development
related to IP-based
communications. This change
impacts our addressable
market, competition, and our
objective setting and strategies,
as well as the need to consider
risks to achieve our set
objectives. Should we not
succeed in understanding the
market development or acquire
the necessary competence or
develop and market products
and solutions that are
competitive in this changing
market, our future results will
suffer.” (Annual report 2007,
p.105.)
(continued on next page)
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Customer
value
proposition
To deliver application and
services,
components for ﬁxed
broadband access, components
for core networks, and
components for
mobile broadband access.
To deliver application and
services, components for
ﬁxed broadband access,
components for core
networks, components for
mobile broadband access,
and solutions for
multimedia services.
Distribution channels Mainly direct sales Mainly direct sales
Customer segments Mainly network operators Mainly network operators
Revenue model One-off sales, per usage One-off sales, per usage
Nokia Summary Design, develop, manufacture,
and
distribution of mobile phones
for consumer and
business segment (plus
network); strong own
supply chain and
manufacturing for large-scale
model
The company rested on its
laurels of being a dominant
mobile phone player and
tried different approaches
to integrate mobile internet
and enterprise solutions
into their offering.
Particularly, a business-
oriented series was
launched to compete
against emerging
smartphone offerings and
incentivizing small ﬁrms to
co-develop with this unit.
After little success with
various silo-initiatives
against emerging
smartphone competition,
the company ultimately
started collaboration with a
major software operating
system provider,
abandoning its own
software and ecosystem
efforts, and choosing to
focus on devices.
Secondary “The emergence of ecosystems
in and around the mobile
device market for smartphones
represents the broad
convergence of the mobile
communication, computing,
consumer electronics, and
Internet industries. Different
industry participants, such as
hardware manufacturers,
software providers, developers,
publishers, entertainment
providers, advertisers, and
ecommerce specialists, are
forming increasingly large
communities of mutually
beneﬁcial partnerships in order
to bring their offerings to the
market. At the heart of the
major smartphone ecosystems
is the operating system and the
development platform upon
which smartphones are based
and services built.” (Annual
report 2011)
“Those types of decisions are
made from a strategic
standpoint, for overall [our
company], and about
the direction they want to take
the company, so you know, the
corporate board, then it is
looking at each and every one of
those business groups, works
out a strategy for each and
every one of those business
groups, and then it is looking at
what we have in our IP
portfolio, within the business
groups, and across Nokia,
where are the gaps, and how do
we ﬁll those gaps, do we make,
partner, or buy, then,
depending on how critical it is
to have that, either own it
internally or not, we'll then
determine how you go about
partnering or acquiring or just
building it on your own.”
(interview)
“Even if considering current
solutions, number of
subscribers, RIM, or other
vendors that enable mobile
email on the phone, [the
ongoing changes represent a]
potential revenue opportunity
for [our company] and other
providers. Not only from a
consumer standpoint, but also
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from an enterprise standpoint.”
(interview)
“A great opportunity for [our
company] is: our business is
consumer-focused, we can
draw from the consumer pool
and address the trend of email
going mobile. From the
enterprise side, we will go out
to large enterprises, a large
untapped market.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
“Connecting people”, based on
high-quality
handset devices, supported by
design, ease
of use, and user-friendly
platform.
Develop the best hardware
experience for smartphone
customers in the Windows
phone ecosystem with
strong partnership with
Microsoft
Distribution channels Mainly through retailers and
mobile operators
Mainly through retailers
and mobile operators, plus
ﬂagship stores
Customer segments Business customers and
consumers
Business customers and
consumers, B2B
Revenue model High margins on devices, based
on scale advantages
High margins on devices,
based on scale advantages
Apple Summary Design (and manufacture) of
computers with
integrated operating system for
sale to
home-users, creative
professionals, and universities.
The company ﬁrst started to
bring music experience
through MP3 players and a
music store. Later it
integrated and started to
leverage mobile telephones
and mobile applications.
The company also started to
design and sell media
tablets. All with seamless
integration where the
services can be used
through most hardware
platforms. The purpose is
that the products and
services should be highly
complementary. Hence, the
diversiﬁcation into new
areas was highly related
where each area was highly
integrated into the existing
business model where the
software and common
platforms became the
denominator.
Primary “The other thing that I was
blind about for a bit, because I
come from a different world, is
that if you look at current users,
we have to design for a
grandma e can she ﬁgure this
out? The analogy ﬂaw that was
pointed out to me, if you look at
kind of the evolution of the
proliferation of computers, you
know kids in these days, […]
how they learn everything. A
great analogy was made to me
in terms of, you know I am
technical [by background], I
was formerly trained in this
area; [I was told] ‘You are still
technically a second, you are an
immigrant basically, you speak
the language because you have
learned it, but it is not native to
you. Whereas your kids,
basically with no formal
training, they were born into
this generation, they are the
ﬁrst generation of true native
computer users.’ […] The next
generation will raise the bar
signiﬁcantly in [our company].”
(interview)
“I would like to say that it was
pre-emptive visionary thinking,
but it wasn't. It was more
reacting. It wasn't that we were
completely wrong. But it was
more that this is the way the
market is heading and the
consumer market has changed
quickly. But it was a tide turn.
Something changes and I need
to change, and I have not much
resistance internally.”
(interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Enabling private and ofﬁce
work
by user-friendly computing
Enabling “digital lifestyle”
by user-friendly multi-
device ecosystem, based on
(continued on next page)
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system, based on integration of
hardware and software,
thereby differentiating from the
competition
integration of hardware
and software, thereby
differentiating from the
competition; mobile
devices, and new forms of
devices, strong integration
between products, unique
buying experience,
education, and on-the-spot
service in stores
Distribution channels Specialized retailers Specialized retailers, online
content store for software
and services
Customer segments Consumers, creative industry,
education sector
Consumers, creative
industry, education sector,
mobile users, mainstream
consumers
Revenue model High margins on integrated PC
conﬁgurations and accessories
Repetitive sales, high
margins on integrated
devices, margins on usage
of products through
applications and service
sales
Palm Summary Design of PDA hardware and
software with computer
synchronization ability
Quit in-house PDA
development and started to
build smartphones, in
particular, through
cooperation with another
major provider of Internet-
enabled smartphones and
mobile operators. In this
transition, the company
tried several approaches to
sourcing versus developing
the software development
and ﬁnally abandoned
proprietary software. At the
same time, literally closing
down its international
business and moving from
an international to a
national provider.
Primary “It's a freakin' Frankenstein! It
can do a lot of things, but
nothing really good.”
(interview)
“I don't think the […] platform
is viable long term in the face of
its competition.” (analyst
comment)
“The challenges then are how
do we create and leverage
models so that rivals feel that
‘we're in line with them,’ we
add value towhat they're doing,
we're not just about ‘what
business are you working on,
thank you very much, and I can
add it to my pipeline’.”
(interview)
“When we had reviews of this
device, people said, ‘well, it's
pretty good, it's almost as good
as a [your old device]!’. We're
competing against ourselves.”
(interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Solve personal diary
organization by offering unique
user-friendly experience within
integrated personal
information management (PIM)
device
Solve personal diary
organization by offering
smartphone based on
integration into third-party
vendor's OS
Distribution channels Retailers Through operators, i.e.,
with national/regional
operators
Customer segments International business and
consumer users
National business and
consumer users
Revenue model Sales of devices with integrated
software
Sales of devices
HP Summary Leading provider of accessory
hardware for the personal and
professional computing world
(mainly inkjet and laser
printers) but also strongly
positioned on personal
computers and server systems.
Experimented to respond to
convergence through
increasing collaboration
across different business
lines. Particularly,
experimenting with digital
photo online service on the
basis of the acquisition of a
related startup company.
Secondary “People are going to print
images taken from camera
phones, easy enough, and then
we have a big ecosystemmodel,
where we sell printers, and
then people buy ink cartridges,
and laser toners etc., and that,
you know, makes us money. So
it's a razor blade model, in
many senses.” (interview)
“Parallel process is the way [our
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company] is doing it. OK, I'm
gonna in some sense parallel
process, I'm going to be very
willing to look outside and
acquire and partner with other
companies.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Supporting ofﬁce and private
work through providing
computer hardware products
(printers, scanners, digital
cameras, calculators, PDAs,
servers, workstation
computers, and computers for
home and small business use),
with related technologies and
solutions
Supporting ofﬁce and
private work through
providing computer
hardware products
(printers, scanners, digital
cameras, calculators, PDAs,
servers, workstation
computers, and computers
for home and small
business use), with related
technologies, solutions,
software, and services
Distribution channels Direct sales, OEM, retail Direct sales, OEM, retail,
partners in the ecosystem
Customer segments Consumers, small- and
medium-sized businesses
(SMBs), and large enterprises,
including customers in the
government, health, and
education sectors
Consumers, small- and
medium-sized businesses
(SMBs) and large
enterprises, including
customers in the
government, health, and
education sectors
Revenue model One-off sales of devices;
razorblade model for printers
and cartridges; service and
lease model
One-off sales of devices;
razorblade model for
printers and cartridges;
service and lease model
SonyEricsson Summary Developing, manufacturing,
and selling mobile phones, PC-
cards, and Machine-to-Machine
solutions.
Developing, manufacturing,
and selling mobile phones,
PC-cards, and Machine-to-
Machine solutions.
Launched separate
smartphone line. No
changes in the main
business model.
Secondary
Customer
value
proposition
Offering connectivity and
experience through bringing
innovative mobile phone
products to market
Offering connectivity and
experience through
bringing innovative mobile
phone products to market
Distribution channels Retailers Retailers
Customer segments The company aims to reach
mainly high-end users. This
means that the company has
chosen not to focus on budget
phones. Both professional and
consumers
The company aims to reach
mainly high-end users. This
means that the company
has chosen not to focus on
budget phones. Both
professional and consumers
Revenue model One-off sales of devices One-off sales of devices
TeliaSonera Summary The company delivers ﬁxed and
mobile telephony and
broadband and cable TV
infrastructure. Most of the
services are marketed to the
same customer segment.
The company delivers ﬁxed
and mobile telephony and
broadband and cable TV
infrastructure. Based on the
services, the company also
delivers more third-party
content on demand. The
different business areas are
kept separated using the
same business model.
Secondary “Our value chain can be
increasingly substituted by
those of Internet players. We
need to look at different
competitors now.”
(approximate comment at
management workshop)
Customer
value
proposition
Provisioning of connectivity
and data volume for ﬁxed and
mobile telephony, broadband
Internet, cable TV
infrastructure, related services
Provisioning of connectivity
and data volume for ﬁxed
and mobile telephony,
broadband Internet, cable
TV infrastructure, related
services, content (e.g.,
movie rental), mobile
broadband, payment
services
(continued on next page)
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Distribution channels Own stores, retailers, online Own stores, retailers, online
Customer segments Consumer and corporate
customers
Consumer and corporate
customers
Revenue model Pay per usage Pay per usage, ﬂat rate, pay
for additional services
Swisscom Summary A traditional national provider
of telephony and other telecom
services, resulting from
national post and telegraph,
thereby enjoying favorable
market dominance
Meeting convergence
through no major change in
existing business model,
but rather through
launching various
initiatives to offer new
technologies to customer,
thereby positively
inﬂuencing main service
perception. Some of the
launched initiatives
cannibalized existing
business.
Secondary “We need to test and play
around, look at new services,
work much more closely
together with the customer,
and jointly develop things.”
(interview)
“It is now about solutions and
user experience, offering to the
customer what he really wants.
The customer is not dependent
of us anymore, he can easily
switch. [Therefore,] we need to
offer a platform, where the
customer gets the feeling that
he can do what he wants. You
become an enabler, not
anymore a dictator, who alone
decides what the customer gets.
You enable him to have a better
experience.
Thendconvergence is not an
issue anymore, but rather a
starting point.” (interview)
“Now, we need to start
separating our businesses. [On
the one hand,] infrastructure
and access, a utility, like power
and water, has to simply ‘be
there.’ We call it ‘online
oxygen,’ it is a bread and butter
business, which belongs to the
infrastructure of every country.
That is one option, but in the
future one thousand people
would be enough to run this
whole infrastructure for our
country, including wholesale.
[On the other hand,], the
question is, does one want to go
one step further and become a
provider of services. That is a
totally new business, where we
then also need to offer what the
customer wants in the future.
[…] There we will meet totally
new competitors, such as
Google, Yahoo, cable operators,
Disney, Hollywood, etc. […]
Here it will all be about user
experience, […] and the
customer will not be dependent
anymore and can more easily
switch.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
“Offer services”, including ﬁxed,
mobile telephony, broadband
Internet, cable TV
infrastructure, related services
“Enable services”, including
ﬁxed, mobile telephony,
broadband Internet, cable
TV infrastructure, rental of
equipment, hotel hotspots,
Europe-wide hotspots,
related services
Distribution channels Own stores, retailers, online Own stores, retailers, online
Customer segments Consumer, corporate Consumer, corporate
Revenue model Pay per usage Pay per usage, ﬂat rate, pay
for additional services
France Telecom Summary A multinational
telecommunications
Focused efforts on mobile
communications subsidiary
Secondary “[For our company] as an
incumbent, due to
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corporation, emanating out of a
traditional national telephony
carrier
in combination with related
international acquisitions.
Developing innovative
pricing services, at the same
time starting various, yet
uncoordinated initiatives to
deliver Internet content.
deregulation, it is per deﬁnition
given that an incumbent loses
market sharedthe question
rather is, howmuch of the 100%
are we loosing, and how much
of new services models can an
incumbent operator pioneer.”
(interview)
“Operators need to go more
downstream in the value chain,
because the Internet players
will move more upstream.”
(interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Provisioning of connectivity
and data volume based on ﬁxed,
mobile telephony, broadband
Internet, related services
Provisioning of connectivity
and data volume based on
ﬁxed, mobile telephony,
broadband Internet, IPTV,
related services
Distribution channels Own stores, retailers, online Own stores, retailers, online
Customer segments National consumer and
corporate
International consumer and
corporate
Revenue model Pay per usage Pay per usage, ﬂat rate, pay
for additional services
Google Summary Launched a web search engine
based on an innovative
algorithm and achieved a
sustainable business through a
simple advertising revenue
model.
Building on the successful
advertising model, the ﬁrm
started to continuously
launch new service
offerings, which oftentimes
were prototypes only, and
left to the customer base for
acceptance and usage tests.
Some of these led to new
services and entire business
units, whereas others were
closed down. All initiatives
were synchronized with
the main business model,
driving trafﬁc to the search
enginedand thereby the
advertisement revenue
model.
Primary “The conclusion is that there
will be a big shift in advertising
spend to this new medium. So
what you are seeing is
industries in general looking at
different ways of spending
money that they hadn't done
before because this new
medium existed.” (interview)
“So if you look at different
industries, let's take travel,
everybody wants [our
company] to do a travel site, we
haven't done one, we don't
have time to do one, but the
reason why we could do one is
because the more inventory we
get, for instance, where people
can buy keywords to put on a
web site the more, […] that
means more and more people
will start searching on [our
website] on travel, so the travel
advertising will start spending
more and more money on [our
website] to advertise to them.
So that's why it is important to
look at different verticals, you
know, if there is a way we can
get more money.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Organize web content through
free, intuitive, precise,
intelligent search engine,
offering best web search
experience, and related free
web-based services/application
(e.g., webmail, maps and photo
sharing)
Provide access to free
Internet content through a
variety of computing
devices and cloud-based
services, offering seamless
integration across them
Distribution channels Direct, online information
service
Direct, online information
service, online store,
retailers
Customer segments Mass market using desktop
computers
Mass market using a variety
of different computing
devices
Revenue model Advertisements through search
engine
Advertisements through
search engine through
(continued on next page)
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driving trafﬁc and devices
sales
Yahoo Summary Launched a web search engine
based on smart categorization
and pioneered the era of online
portals
Started to offer adjacent
software-related services
with various isolated
initiatives targeting niche
segments (e.g., hosted
services for SME ﬁrms). Yet,
none of these services
gained traction and were
partly discarded from the
portfolio. Main business
model remained largely
unchanged.
Secondary “If you can become the platform
behind it, you have a lot more
reach, and over time, you build
a really, really strong base of
other businesses and other
service providers providing
additional value.” (interview)
Customer
value
proposition
Offering generic online
applications based on
comprehensive consumer web
services, including web portal,
search engine, email, news,
advertising, and related
applications
Offering access to business
applications based on
comprehensive hosted
suite and web services,
including web portal,
search engine, email, news,
vertical applications and
advertising
Distribution channels Direct, online information
service
Direct, online information
service, including and
incentivizing third-party
development (particularly
for mobile solutions)
through open platform
Customer segments Mass market using desktop
computers
SME ﬁrms, mass market
using desktop computers
Revenue model Advertisements through search
engine, “banners”
Advertisements through
search engine, “banners”
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